4,837 hijacked GitHub accounts used to plant a CI secret stealer in thousands of repositories
Per security firm Aikido, an attacker used stolen credentials for 4,837 GitHub accounts and tested 61,764 repositories for write access. The Hacker News reports the stealer ran in at least 1,806 repositories, and BleepingComputer says secrets were confirmed stolen from at least 1,835 targets. Both reports are dated November 12, 2026.
Hijacked accounts were used to add a secrets stealer to CI workflows
According to analysis by the security firm Aikido, the attacker worked from 4,837 GitHub accounts whose credentials had been stolen. Reports from The Hacker News and BleepingComputer, both dated November 12, 2026, carry the same figure. The accounts were used to check whether they had write access to 61,764 repositories.
The check was a pull request titled "docs: dependency audit notes", opened from a branch named wfx-docs. Where write access existed, a shell script of roughly 1,500 lines was inserted into an existing workflow, placed in a fresh workflow on a temporary branch, or wired into an npm postinstall hook. BleepingComputer, citing Aikido, puts the start of the campaign at about 12:45 UTC on November 10, 2026.
Counts differ by source; the script targets cloud and package publishing credentials
The counts vary between sources. The Hacker News, citing Aikido, says the stealer ran in at least 1,806 repositories. SafeDep, which looked only at default branches of public repositories, counted 8,093 repositories with malicious commits: 7,309 with an addition to an existing workflow and 771 with an npm hook. BleepingComputer reports that researchers confirmed secrets stolen from at least 1,835 targets. The Hacker News notes that SafeDep counted all repositories hit by a malicious commit, whether or not the stealer actually executed there.
The script collects Actions secrets, GITHUB_TOKEN and OIDC tokens, AWS, Azure and Google Cloud credentials, npm, PyPI and SSH keys, and AI service keys. It trades GitHub OIDC tokens for cloud sessions and, where permissions allow, can create long-lived credentials. On Azure it is reported to add federated credentials prefixed wfx-ci-, which could keep access alive even after tokens are rotated.
Changes were mostly reverted soon after and run logs deleted, though a correction note on The Hacker News says some changes stayed in place longer. BleepingComputer reports that 92% of the probe pull requests remain open; The Hacker News gives that 92% figure for the 10,431 probes submitted through collaborator or organization access.
On the package side, the reports name Packagist digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.3 and versions v1.0.278 and v1.0.280 of the Go module github.com/onuragtas/docker-env; The Hacker News adds a pseudo-version of the Go module github.com/vkuznet/gocurl and 28 WebdriverIO repositories. The Hacker News says at least 50, and BleepingComputer about 50, of the compromised accounts appear to have publishing rights on npm, Go, Packagist, PyPI or crates. BleepingComputer lists Fortune 100 organizations, the US GSA, the French government, Nextcloud and WebdriverIO among the affected account owners.
Aikido says the goal is build pipeline secrets, not spreading through packages
The stealer goes after the keys a CI pipeline can reach. Aikido says the attacker appears to be after CI secrets rather than trying to spread through packages. Where the stealer ran, the Hacker News says every secret and cloud role available to those workflows should be treated as compromised. Aikido says any account that opened a probe pull request should be treated as compromised, even if the stealer never ran there.
Attribution calls for care. According to The Hacker News, Aikido does not tie this activity to GhostAction's October wave: the accounts overlap, but differences in infrastructure, tools and methods keep it from naming one actor for now. The Hacker News also found new pull requests with the same title, opened early on November 12 after Aikido's search had ended (it checked three, all from wfx-docs branches); whether the stealer followed is not clear, so we do not give an end date.
What it means for businesses in Türkiye
This section is our reading, not a fact from the sources. The reports name no Türkiye-specific scope, but agencies, software teams and e-commerce developers who use GitHub Actions and npm are the kind of target this campaign fits.
The steps the sources suggest are simple: revoke tokens, OAuth grants, SSH keys and sessions for possibly hijacked accounts, turn on two-factor authentication, rotate every secret the affected repositories can read, and look for the wfx-docs branch and its pull request. Any computer where npm install was run against an affected commit should also be considered compromised.
The UNALSOFT view
When a website is built, the build and deploy pipeline is as much a security surface as the pages on display. We read this story as a prompt to review the CI secrets, account protection and publishing permissions behind web design and development projects. The reports describe hijacked individual accounts; whether your own project was touched is a separate question that needs a look at your repository history.
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